



AUTHORITARIANISM, PATRONAGE, FAMILY PESANTREN AND ELECTIONS: THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA

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Abstract

The Pesantren people's involvement in politics is a new phenomenon regarded as an obstacle to the democratic process and progress. This paper goals to fill the hole in present research on the dominance of the Pesantren humans in nearby politics, which they appear to have strategically mastered. The methodology in this study concerned qualitative data accumulated via commentary techniques, interviews, and documentation. The outcomes have been analyzed, interpreted, and verified. The study aims to prove that the Pesantren family, including chief officials, utilized country facilities and worried about dynastic politics. The find out additionally explores the roles of social, economic, and political capital in election wins. Furthermore, they learn about how dynastic politics has weakened the democratic system and proposes a revision of modern election approaches to ensure fair elections by strengthening election supervision and encouraging voter education.

Keywords : *authoritarianism, patronage, pesantren, political democracy, elections*

1. INTRODUCTION

The domination of the Pesantren dynasty in local politics impacts the democratic method in Indonesia (de Man et al., 2020; Menchik, 2019; Patrikios & Xezonakis, 2019). It has been shown that strength primarily based on kinship results in the availability of human resources, the improvement of society, and people's overall well-being. Nepotism in Indonesian politics has been generally practiced in local elections; however, the Pesantren family's political participation is new. The oligarchic political system nominates candidates who are local elites, therefore perpetuating the building of a dynastic power community. Dynastic developments are dominant in the political dynamics in modern Indonesia, ensuing in an unhealthy democracy unable to criticize and manage authorities' coverage (Azizah et al., 2021; Faizin, 2017; Prihatini, 2019; Tajab & Yogyakarta, 2017). The circle of strength refers to political elitism based totally on nepotism and kinship (Barry Cannon, 2016; Geletkanycz, 2020; Goldstein et al., 2020; Veltmeyer, 2020).

This study aims to fill the research gap on the domination of the Pesantren humans in neighborhood politics. However, some research has proven that the Pesantren household has overpowered the strategic sectors in neighborhood politics (Armoyu & Azizah, 2020; Sutisna, 2017). The find out about proposes three questions: (a) How does Pesantren dynastic electricity succeed in the nearby politics of East Java? (b) What are the elements of Pesantren's dynastic strength domination in local politics? (c) How does the authority of the Pesantren dynasty in local politics affect democracy at the neighborhood level?

This article argues that the spiritual elite is crucial in bringing about strength and authority. Ordinary capital additionally features to help diversity, which manifests in numerous conditions: First, following the regulations stipulated in general. Second, relying on the belief device of the spiritual adherents. Finally, spiritual supporters constantly participate in non-secular things (Basu, 2019; Grusky & Mills, 2018; Lucas, 2016; Sovacool et al., 2019; Sovacool & Brisbois, 2019). According to there are three kinds of legitimation. First is legitimation by traditional authority; 2nd

is charismatic authority primarily based on spiritual elitism, and 1/3 is rational bureaucratic authority, generally legitimation primarily based on regulations and interpretation (Chen & Urminsky, 2019; Mahajan & Templer, 2021).

The find out about additionally explores the position of the patron-client, which some political specialists reflect on the reason for the economic effect in politics in growing countries. The patron-client relationship must not have dangerous consequences in a contemporary country with financial advances and excessive training. Simpson noted that the patron-client relationship exists in any society, modern and non-modern, authoritarian, democratic, and others (Simpson, 2016).

Literature Review

Political dynasty refers to authority stemming from kinship or connection to preceding leaders. Political dynasties can exist in any country around the world, such as democratic nations like the Kennedy households in the U.S., Menem in Argentina, Nehru-Gandhi household in India, Aquino and Ortega family in the Philippines, and the Bhuttos in Pakistan (Aspinall & As'ad, 2016; Mendoza et al., 2016; Ruud & Islam, 2016). However, the phenomenon most often happens in creating nations with youthful democracies. There are three imperative factors in forming political dynasties amongst nearby administrations. (1) The political dynasty is part of an extensive network primarily based on reciprocal family members in which household relation is the most common. (2) A united community of heirs. (3) Political dynasties are formed and later abolished beneath harsh political contestation in which the dynastic succession is no longer the sole element of success (Inomata et al., 2017; Ruud & Islam, 2016).

The household connection provides an excellent gain for the candidacy of a specific political role and money owed for a greater chance of general elections utilizing the usage of the household identity as a political vehicle, as for occasion in Italy when a politician provides a well-known family member to pick out the household connection to get vote elections (Chen & Urminsky, 2019; Corstange, 2018; Prihatini, 2019). Politicians from political dynasties experienced manufacturers identify blessings that supply significant advantages over non-dynasty politicians (Feinstein, 2010); thus, keeping a secure connection to the "clan" is essential as a marketing campaign approach that goals the core supporters. This idea is frequently recognized as particularism politics. In Indonesia, political dynasties have a central position. So regional and neighborhood politics are run utilizing households fundamental to Indonesian "democracy," which is decentralized and displays non-public hobby (Griffin, 2018).

Local politics implements its energy via infrastructure and technical offerings such as establishing and preserving roads, drainage, road lights, and accessible water systems, all of which replicate the position of politics in improving society and social carrier. Local politics and policymaking are constantly extra-local and utilized in many ways. Local politics is the phase of the mobility of policymaking (Barton et al., 2021b; Bjørnå, 2021; Geletkanycz, 2020; Ruud & Islam, 2016; Ruud & Nielsen, 2018). In Madura, when applied, nearby politics is primarily based on a neighborhood spirit animating the moral lifestyles of neighborhood politics, which affords the actualization of self-potencies except for intimidation, Intervention, or dictatorship. If the best situation can't happen in neighborhood politics, it might also now not grow to be impartial. In Route, Papua, nearby politics has created identification polemics like native vs. non-native people. In the Bupati (Regent) election, a candidate promoted himself as the solely native Papuan candidate, anticipating that to entice the majority of the votes of the Papuan indigenous humans (McWilliam, 2011).



In Korea, patronage influences politics in the country-wide political context; however, it has no extensive impact on the local context. Local civilians play crucial roles in enhancing the best of domestic politics (Sidhu et al., 2020). Local politics in Indonesia has been a nation of dynamic alternatives for the final decade. In Indonesia, the main strength (government) has usually tried to manage neighborhood politics due to its herbal resources. Also, there has been an emergence of neighborhood strongmen due to political control of the center. Since Indonesian independence up to the New Order era, the central political Elite's hobbies have intervened in neighborhood politics. However, at the start of the Reformation era, it was once effortless for nearby elites to prioritize their identity and significance by way of getting the space implemented, decentralized as the phase of neighborhood government, and empowered, even though nevertheless mainly decided with the aid of the dynamics of countrywide politics (Hammond et al., 2021; Liddle, 1992).

In general, strength exists in many life factors, its potential to coach and be obeyed, and in the selection, making that at once and in a roundabout way determines action. Power members of the family are a type of social connection that exposes an uneven relationship thru course or quintessential control. This relationship can be viewed between governments and the governed (O'Shea & Ueda, 2021) standard strength system; traditional strength consists of three components: stimulation transmission. Conventional power held utilizing nearby elites is restricted territorially, so the more significant the star strength nearby the Aristocracy, the more great The vital political strength and spaces convergence with the neighborhood and global. The power and authority are redefined below the complicated device of many layers of international governance as a bargaining capacity.

In Thailand, neighborhood politics and democracy steadily developed social justice and the energy of majority rules. The system of improvement has come thru conventional and present-day political eras. Domestic politics in Thailand is in transitional progress towards democracy; it is indispensable to observe that Thai authorities' policy helps and promotes democracy in Thailand. Public participation and adjustments in the political way of life may want to help overcome fighting issues and valuable resources to improve the politics and democracy in the neighborhood of Thailand (Deutsch et al., 2020; Kim, 2015). In the Pesantren community, politics is about leadership and controlling profane and prophetic matters. Many Pesantren graduates construct political parties out of criminal obligation.

Based on the felony basis of "mala" (the completion of obligation is mandatory), developing a political celebration and political participation is a responsibility (Haug et al., 2020; Kopecký et al., 2016). They additionally work on the premise of assembling human beings to the place they are at, encouraging them to seem inside and improve their attention and convictions, which will lead them to authenticity (Lukens-Bull, 2007). Kiai (Religious Elite), santri (Students), and the different beliefs of the Pesantren human beings are influential in countrywide leadership (Simbolon, 2021). From the village Pesantren scope, Kiai (religious Elite) and santri (students) use the spiritual values of the nearby neighborhood to a country-wide degree to alternate people's mindsets related to many components of existence in Indonesia, together with politics. Patron-client underneath Pesantren culture can construct kinship and civilizations to advance a social device that influences society. Thus, relations between elite pesantren and students affect management characteristics and become position models, the supply of rules, and the driver of social and political development in Indonesia (Aitamurto, 2021; Barton et al., 2021a; Bruinessen, 2018).

Pesantren training lets in neighborhood development, resulting in empowered financial capabilities, well-being access, and cultural-political skills. Those three factors relate to the four dimensions of power: the power within, strength to, control over, and manage with. Territorial politics restrict neighborhood democracy based totally on the area and potentially obtained utilizing

people's participation, interactions, and discussions for consensus. However, people's reluctance to be concerned about formulating policy becomes an essential task for parliament participants and the sustainability of political manipulation of local authorities (Lucas, 2016; McGregor, 2013; Sisler, 2011).

Local democratic performance can be characterized thus: (1) Local democracy performs higher if the humans are invested in their community; (2) nearby democracy performs higher (3) neighborhood democracy performs higher when human beings recognize their rights and obligations in the neighborhood decision making; and (4) nearby democracy features higher with active citizen participation (Gendzwill & Swianiewicz, 2016). Observing these four traits will enhance neighborhood authorities by way of growing participation in nearby elections, strengthening leadership, reforming internal administration of the local authority, most of them with the aid of the personal sector, and permitting human beings to be worried about the choice making of the nearby power (Bae & Kim, 2013; Leonard, 2018; Sumbas, 2020).

In Macedonia, empowerment of neighborhood democracy is performed via decentralization that brings local authorities nearer to the people/citizens. Consequently, it lets nearby human beings participate in the decision-making method. This decentralization initiative is driven by new acts, including civilian initiatives, famous meetings, and referendums, to expand the town administration's transparency, accountability, and responsiveness to the local administration. Local democracy insists that the method of reformation ((Arghiros, 2016; Boret et al., 2021; Ho et al., 2015) not solely be initiated at the central stage but at the neighborhood policymaking stage as well. People's participation is substantially impactful in policymaking. In India, public involvement in neighborhood village conferences is fundamental for the discourse on democracy and decentralization policies. A decentralization coverage has to permit neighborhood leaders to channel people's participation into things of people's welfare (Deininger et al., 2020). In Arab nations that are creating into democracies, we can anticipate indigenous varieties of democracy in the place faith (in this case, Islam) performs a significant role—and this reinterpreted, "authenticated" Islam should always include females as energetic and equal individuals in political existence (el-Husseini, 2016; Saada, 2020).

2. IMPLEMENTATION METHOD

The power of influence of boarding schools to build dynastic politics was chosen as the subject of this paper with three considerations. First, how does Pesantren dynastic electricity succeed in the nearby politics of East Java. Second, What are the elements of Pesantren's dynastic strength domination in local politics. Third, How does the authority of the Pesantren dynasty in local politics affect democracy at the neighborhood level. Understanding this does require mapping to formulate actions. The above considerations are expected to provide a thorough reading and insight for problem-solving, especially in dynastic politics.

This qualitative research rests on primary and secondary data. Primary data were taken from field studies to observe directly and from the mapping research aspect. The data needed consists of data on the form, factors, and implications of the political studies of the significant family dynasties of the Bahrul Ulum Tambak Beras Islamic boarding school in Jombang, East Java. First, Connecting Pesantren and Political Power. Second, Elite Religious: Building Oligarchy Politics. Third, Citizen Carter, Socio Culture and Political Support in Local Politics. Fourth, Pesantren's Power's influence on the democratic process in local politics.

This study involved three parties in the data collection. They are (a) informants consisting of Aparatur Sipil Negara (ASN) of the Jombang Kabupaten Government; (b) legislators of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPRD) (c) Groups of Ulama and students who have patron-client relations with the Bahrul Ulum Jombang Islamic Boarding School. The three parties were involved



in examining how to build dynastic politics by utilizing pesantren, the big name of KH. Wahab Hasbullah, The great figure of Nahdhatul Ulama and Mrs. Nyai Munjidah Wahab, a pertahana as the Regent of Jombang. This pesantren network significantly influences the victory of his son's daughter as a member of the Regional People's Representative Sewan (DPRD) of Jombang Regency, the DPRD of East Java Province, and the DPR / MPR RI.

The research process lasted two months, starting with desk reviews, field observations, and interviews. Before field research was conducted, various secondary materials, including online news, were collected to map the genealogy of Islamism in text form. Further Observations are made in several chamber meetings, where the hybrid identities of the parties can be observed directly. Finally, the interview was conducted with the three informants mentioned above for mapping purposes.

Then, the data analysis is carried out in two stages. First, it is carried out before the research work; Second, it begins when data collection begins and after accumulating data for a specific duration. Determine the method of data collection, data analysis, type of research, time and place of the study (if the article is based on the field research),

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.1 Connecting between Pesantren and Political Power subsection

As a foundation for domination, social capital requires a social community of relations owned by Bu Munjidah Wahab. The Regent has been concerned about the company because she used to be young. She was the autonomic organ of Nahdatul Ulama, like Ikatan Pelajar Pemuda Perempuan NU (IPPNU) Jombang, then energetic in Fatayat as the Head of Muslimat NU-Branch in Jombang for two periods. In addition, she is additionally the supervisor (Pengasuh) of the Pesantren Putri Bahrul Ulum Tambak Beras Jombang, East Java. Genealogically she is the daughter of KH. Wahab Hasbullah is a national hero and one of the founding fathers of Nahdhatul Ulama (the most outstanding Islamic organization in Indonesia).

After being energetic in more than a few social organizations, the political party, specifically the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) Munjidah Wahab, grew to become a legislator; this is the way that led him to turn out to be the head of the region and managed to construct an oligarchy household strength in local politics. There are three elements to strolling a political dynasty. The first is the economic factor; to take section in the Regional head election and Legislative Election (Teguh & Lubis, n.d.), one needs enormous monetary capital. Financial capital is the driving computing device of political parties, as campaigns require cash to pay for birthday party recommendations, register with political parties, print posters and banners, pay for advertisements, and pay for consultants and success groups at various levels. The success group generally uses the financial capital in what is known as the sunrise assault to persuade voters to participate.

The second is the political factor. When Bu Munjidah ran as the Jombang Regent Candidate, she offered a suggestion letter from Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) for a political drive, as did her sons and daughters, hence succeeding in retaining octopus-like political energy in Jombang Regency. The third is the social factor. As a foundation for domination, social capital is the possession of a social community of familial members of the family, like with Bu Munjidah Wahab.

3.2 Elite Religious: Building Oligarchy Politics

Ruud and Nielsen can recognize the Pesantren descendants constructing octopus-like power. They describe political dynasties as a section of an extensive community of gaining and

perpetuating power. Jombang is made up of dynasty politics. A sturdy community of sons and daughters utilizes their household identity and district where their mom serves as regional head as a political tool. This strategy can be likened to a "brand name." For example, the name KH. Wahab Hasbullah (one of the founders of the NU) is synonymous with the most distinguished spiritual company in Indonesia and one of KH. Wahab Hasbullah's grandson is a legislator. The octopus-like power of political dynasties in Jombang, in the authors' view, goals to a) secure political positions at each neighborhood and central level; b) set up synergy in the utilization of central, provincial, and regional budgets; c) and accumulate monetary capital by way of budgeting for political purposes.

3.3 Citizen Carter, Socio Culture and Political Support in Local Politics

Social, economic, and political capital is used to attain power. In this instance, the colonial capital consists of a dynastic household identity and Pesantren network; the political capital is the political strength and advantages the expression confers. Economic prosperity is used to reap votes from constituents. Although social capital is precious in Jombang, monetary wealth is nevertheless necessary. Financial capital in the dynasty offers logistical marketing campaign factors like promotional cloth on tv and social media. That said, the higher the social capital of a candidate, the less financial cash is needed. Conversely, economic wealth is necessary for voting if a candidate has low social and political capital.

3.4 Pesantren's Power's influence on the democratic process in local politics.

Local democracy, which implements strength decentralization, brings political elites out of the regions. In general, democracy can be viewed from two sides—positive and negative. Local democracy is exemplary when there are four implementation techniques: enhancing neighborhood leadership, reforming management, growing neighborhood voter participation, and infrastructure development supplied by the government. However, local democratic strategies are negative about inside management. Political dynasties are challenging to control; they look at stability insurance policies and leaders, and humans are afraid to criticize them. They remember loyal humans alternatively than wise people, which affects authorities missing innovation and management. Moreover, power distribution is constrained to unique families, which sooner or later weakens democracy.

4. CONCLUSION

This paper reveals several significant findings related to circle local power. First, the employment of familial relations in politics is a means of preserving power in legislative elections. Second, at least three types of capital are used in local politics to gain control: social, economic, and political. The greater the social capital of a candidate, the less financial money is needed. However, economic prosperity is vital in seeking votes if the candidate has weak social and political capital. Another issue is the misuse of power for personal and organizational well-being. Introspect, this study found that the octopus-like power of political dynasties in local politics has weakened democracy.

This study's scope is limited to the Jombang Regency, which leaves room for further research on octopus-like power structures in other regions. However, as East Java Province's population is large, the study results may be representative of the situation in many areas of Indonesia.



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