

## TERRORISM PREVENTION WITH INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING AND PREDICTIVE POLICING COLLABORATION IN SOUTH SUMATERA REGION

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Received : 22 November 2024	Published : 26 January 2025
Revised : 13 December 2024	DOI : <a href="https://doi.org/10.54443/morfai.v4i4.2419">https://doi.org/10.54443/morfai.v4i4.2419</a>
Accepted : 28 December 2024	Publish Link : <a href="https://radjapublika.com/index.php/MORFAI/article/view/2419">https://radjapublika.com/index.php/MORFAI/article/view/2419</a>

### Abstract

This article aims to describe the pattern of terrorism prevention with the collaboration of Intelligence-Led Policing and Predictive Policing in the South Sumatra region. Until now, there has only been one terrorist attack in South Sumatra, namely the shooting of a Christian junior high school teacher in Palembang City in 2008 with the motive that the teacher often insulted students who wore headscarves at his school. So far, the South Sumatra Regional Police have succeeded in preventing terrorist attacks, as evidenced by several arrests made before the terrorist attacks in 2017, 2018 and 2020. However, the concept of preventing terrorist attacks has not been carried out systematically by the Intelligence Function at the South Sumatra Regional Police. The prevention carried out has not been systematically through the intelligence-led policing process so that it can predict the potential threat of terrorist attacks. So far, prevention patterns have been carried out by the intelligence of Densus 88 Polri. The involvement of the South Sumatra Regional Police Intelligence is still minimal in efforts to prevent terrorism.

**Keywords:** *Prevention, intelligence-led policing, predicting.*

### INTRODUCTION

The emergence of terrorism and radical groups in Palembang, namely the murder of a Christian teacher at SMP 49 Palembang in the name of Dago Simamora in 2008. Dago Simamora was shot in the km 11 area of Palembang City. Before this incident, there were no terrorism cases in Palembang and South Sumatra. The total number of perpetrators in the Dago Simamora shooting case was eight people. They initially gathered in an organization called the Forum for Anticipation of Apostasy Activities (Fakta) which was chaired by Abdurrahman Thaib. Initially, Fakta had a secretariat in the Tembesu area of Jalan Veteran for two years. Then it moved to Lorong Prapen 24 Ilir, near the Great Mosque, Palembang, by renting a Shophouse (Ruko) for two years as well. In that place there is a one-year Islamic religious education called "Ma'had Baitul Ilmi". This secretariat is actually a computer course place, but it is also the secretariat of Fakta. The actual fact is that it is not a study group, but they often provide religious counseling in schools, mosques to the district/city level. The material taught is the problem of monotheism, Islam, Christology and anticipation of apostasy.

On his journey, Abdurrahman then got acquainted with Ani Sugandhi, Ali Mashudi and Mgs Tony in the Tugumulyo area, OKI and then slowly got information based on reports from the community that there was a Christian teacher at SMP 49 Palembang who often harassed female students who wore the Jilbab. At a different time, this Fakta group got acquainted with Fajar Taslim, because they often prayed at the Grand Mosque which was not far from their secretariat. Then in 2017, the Solihin group emerged in Lubay Ulu District, Muara Enim Regency. The Solihin group lives in a village where there is a religious study group led by Solihin. Solihin is a former marriage registrar in the area. After no longer working as a marriage registrar, Solihin founded a religious study group and became a religious teacher in his village, Lubay Persada, which was attended by approximately twenty to thirty people, including several of his relatives. The study group then began to teach archery to its congregation, and finally taught how to make arrows with explosive chemicals at the tips. This group had determined the target of the attack, namely the OKU Police Headquarters, Baturaja, South Sumatra. However, because their group leader did not agree on the grounds that it was too close to their village. Finally, they decided to attack the Kelapa Dua Depok Mobile Brigade Headquarters, West Java.

Before carrying out their action, the Solihin group affiliated with Jamaah Ansharut Khilafah (JAK) was arrested in separate places on December 10, 2017. The arrests began in Semambu Village, Inderalaya District, Ogan Iir Regency, South Sumatra, continuing to Talang Kramat Village, Talang Kelapa District, Banyuasin Regency, then the leader of their group, Solihin, was arrested at 15.00 WIB in Lubay Persada Village, Lubay Ulu District, Muara Enim Regency, South Sumatra. A total of twelve people were arrested at that time, but seven people continued the legal process.

In 2018, there were two arrests made by Densus 88 Satgaswil Sumbagsel and Polda Sumsel. First, on May 14, 2018, two people suspected of being part of the Jamaah Anshorud Daulah (JAD) group, a terrorist network from Pekanbaru were arrested, and on July 18, 2018, seven people from the JAD network were arrested in several separate places in the Palembang City area. Several arrests continued, namely on July 21, 2018, July 23, 2018, August 3, 2018, and August 25, 2018. A total of 14 people from the JAD terrorist network were arrested in Palembang and its surroundings throughout 2018.

If we look at several terror groups in South Sumatra since 2008, on average they are people who are economically poor. Their education level is generally low, namely graduating from elementary school, junior high school and high school so they are easily influenced, provoked and so on. For example, the group that killed Dago Simamora, were people with low education, except for Agustyawarman who had studied at the Ministry of Law and Human Rights Civil Service School, namely the Correctional Academy, Depok-West Java. They got firearms from Noordin M Top when attending a meeting in 2006 in Cilacap, Central Java attended by Abdurrahman Taib who was later "appointed" as a leader or amir in the Palembang area. Then they met a Singaporean terrorist, Fajar Taslim. Fajar is a fugitive from the Singapore police for planning a bombing at Changi International Airport, Singapore. Fajar was arrested in Sekayu City, Muba Regency, South Sumatra in 2008 and is still serving his sentence at the Nusa Kambangan Correctional Institution, Central Java.

What is interesting is that there is still a Jamaah Islamiyah network in the Palembang area. This is evidenced by the arrest of suspected terrorism. Harno on November 30, 2020 at a cellphone counter around KM 8, Sukarame District, Palembang. So the transformation of the terrorist network from Jamaah Islamiyah to Jamaah Anshorul Khilafah (JAK) and Jamaah Anshorud Daulah (JAD) did not stop the old network from terrorist activities. Harno is suspected of being a network from Lampung because his arrest by Densus 88 Anti-Terror was a development of the arrest of Taufik Bulaga a few days earlier.

Based on the problems that have been explained above, the problem formulation in this research is as follows:

1. What is the role of the South Sumatra Police intelligence with the Intelligence-Led Policing and Predictive Policing models in preventing the emergence of terrorist networks.
2. What is the role of other police functions, especially Binmas, Reserse, Sabhara and related government agencies in preventing the emergence of terrorism in the South Sumatra region.
3. What strategies and patterns are implemented by the government (National Police and other agencies) in reducing and dealing with the emergence of radical groups in South Sumatra.

## Research Methods

With the paradigmatic change in the academic world towards non-positivism, especially towards constructivism as mentioned by Guba and Lincoln, this research is evaluative in nature and then uses a p-approach. Qualitative research with a literature study strategy by analyzing books, journals, media news related to terrorism and its prevention patterns as well as interviews with former terrorist convicts.

## A Glimpse of South Sumatra Province

Provinsi South Sumatra (Sumsel) is a province located in the southern part of the island of Sumatra. Based on the 2020 population census, the population of South Sumatra is 8,467,432 people or 3.13% of the total population of Indonesia spread across 17 districts and cities. The largest distribution is in the city of Palembang, which is 1.67 million people (BPS South Sumatra, 2020: p 3-6).

## Prevention Strategy

Academic research and discourse in the late 20th and early 21st centuries have highlighted that the success of future law enforcement in countering terrorism must be better coordinated and involve a holistic strategy. The terms prevention, detection, investigation in this context relate to this comprehensive strategy. Here, the involvement of other functions in the police such as Binmas, Humas, Reskrim, Brimob, Reskrim is very

much needed, because intelligence cannot work alone to prevent terrorism. Even the police cannot work alone in preventing terrorism. The police are only a small part in preventing crime, while economic, political and cultural factors are the basis for maintaining peace (Ben Bowling, 2016: p. 6). There needs to be efforts to provide information, counseling, and education to the public so that they understand the dangers of terrorism and the consequences of being involved in terrorism cases that also involve related government agencies.

After the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks in the US and after the Padi's Café bombing in Bali on October 12, 2002, the intelligence profession or police officers who work in the intelligence field have their own challenges that are different from the previous period. Previously, Security Intelligence only focused on ordinary crimes, politics, economics and socio-culture, but after the terrorist attacks in Bali, intelligence officers had to deal with a fairly serious threat, namely terrorist attacks. Intelligence officers must build networks among hardline groups to gather information on potential terrorist threats. Intelligence officers must also create a specific indicator of terrorist attack plans and be able to make predictions both in the long term and in the short term. This clarity allows intelligence to have the capability to gather information widely.

Initially, the security intelligence institution and intelligence officers were hesitant to face the continuous and terrible terror attacks, but after training from various countries, in turn, intelligence officers were able to carry out activities. Especially after the establishment of the Jakarta Cooperation For Law Enforcement Center (JCLEC)<sup>1</sup>In Semarang, various trainings are held there, especially training on Counter Terrorism in collaboration with various countries and the participants are from various countries. In addition, Security Intelligence officers and Criminal Investigation Officers also participate in many anti-terror trainings in the United States, Australia, Japan and others.

If in the late 20th century intelligence was often described as a secret activity, there were tricks, intrigues and bad treatment. But in the early 21st century, especially after the 9/11 attacks in the United States and the Bali Bombing I in 2002, little by little that perception disappeared. Because they felt they had failed to prevent terrorist attacks on New Year's Eve 2000 in several churches and the Bali Bombing I in 2002, intelligence organizations had to improve themselves quickly. Intelligence also had to start implementing the methodology correctly and in a structured manner. But the obstacle at that time was that the intelligence budget was still very limited.

Prevention of crime or criminal acts including terrorism is actually nothing new. In modern policing, the most important strategy in providing primary services is a prevention strategy by implementing crime detection based on intelligence reports and predictions, maintaining order and improving morale. It is also important to note that the long-standing system is vigilance and mutual protection between neighbors or often called the neighborhood security system (Siskamling). Actually, this Siskamling is quite effective if implemented consistently and continuously to limit the movement of terrorists. This system is quite effective in detecting people who have just arrived in a residential environment, because usually in the neighborhood of the Neighborhood Association (RT) there are rules about mandatory reporting within 1x24 hours. If there are newcomers in an environment who do not report within a certain period of time, then their existence should be suspected and questioned. In this context, the police as the guardians of public security and order must be proactive in coordinating with Siskamling officers and RT officials in their area of duty to obtain information which is then analyzed and a prediction is made about the potential threat of terrorism in an area.

Crime prevention is the most essential part of proactive policing, community policing and its various variations. One of the strategies in policing is the implementation of various police functions proactively and optimally, one of which is Intelligence-Led Policing. (ILP). The main objective of Intelligence-Led Policing is crime prevention (Virta, 2017: p. 135), including terrorism. There is an expansion of the meaning of crime prevention, as crime has been reconceptualized as a crime risk. Prevention strategies in acts of terrorism must be carried out with various approaches, because the causes and motives of terrorism are also triggered by various factors, including economic, political, social, cultural and religious factors. In the long term, prevention strategies must be attempted to eliminate plans, motivations, intentions and opportunities to carry out acts of terrorism. The socio-cultural, religi us approach is the most important factor through education and teaching in schools. The places of religious education with comprehensive teaching of religious doctrine so as not to be misunderstood by

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<sup>1</sup>JCLEC was established in 2004 based on the cooperation between the Indonesian National Police and the Australian Federal Police (AFP). This institution is a means to improve international cooperation and capacity building. To date, 85 countries have sent participants to improve capacity in law enforcement, especially in the field of counter-terrorism.

people who study religion. Here the role of government agencies that handle the field of education is required, namely the Education Office which is responsible for general education and the Ministry of Religion which is responsible for religious education. So far, both in general education institutions and in religious education institutions have the same potential for the emergence of radicalism. As a result of a study conducted by the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) in collaboration with the South Sumatra Counterterrorism Coordination Forum (FKPT) in 2015 on three large educational institutions in the city of Palembang, both general and religious education, have the potential to become radical by 51%. This figure is certainly quite worrying.

The theory used in this research plan is *Crime Prevention Theory* with three approach models, namely: first *situational crime prevention*, this model describes prevention that attempts to reduce the opportunity structure for certain forms or categories of crime. The second is the model *community crime prevention*, namely a prevention approach based on empowering community strengths through daily activities that emphasize social prerequisites that are expected to be able to change and reduce individual motivation to commit crimes. The third is the model *social crime prevention* which focuses on efforts to address the root causes of crime and study individual tendencies to offend. Insecurity and threats to security must also be prevented. In crime prevention strategies, social exclusion or social marginalization is a priority that must be carried out in preventing security threats which is part of proactive policing. So to maintain security, social integration and resistance to discrimination need to be carried out. Proactive policing and intelligence approaches in the future are strategies to guide crime prevention.

In the Netherlands there are three indicators to distinguish the radicalization process that occurs, namely: **First**, ideology that refers to changes in social life, politics and religious beliefs; second, daily habits such as changes in social interactions, refusing to shake hands with women; third, from the appearance of a person, such as how to dress, having a beard (Sirva: p. 136). In Indonesia, the indicators for assessing someone as a radical cannot be equated as in the Netherlands, although some radical groups or even terrorists have the indicators as above, but there are also some who do not have these indicators. In looking at this indicator the intelligence agent must be very careful in providing analysis, assessment and recommendations for making intelligence reports. Because if it is wrong to detect radical groups that are indicated to have indicators such as above, it will be fatal and inefficient. Because intelligence organizations will spend resources to observe the wrong group. Security intelligence must have a framing of the flow, the thoughts of radical groups with any religious background. There are certain groups that have great potential to lead to radicalism and terrorism. But there are also religious groups that have indicators such as above (bearded, wearing jingkrang pants and others) but the potential to be involved in radicalism and terrorism is very small.

In an effort to prevent radicalism and terrorism, of course there are various problems, namely the lack of knowledge of police officers regarding cultural differences and ethnic or group backgrounds and also about the nature of radicalism and terrorism, language limitations and failure to share information. Police officers also often lose the trust of the community and if trust is lost (distrust) it will be difficult to rebuild it (Sirva: p. 138). Failure to share information that should be the outcome or result of carrying out tasks can be carried out and used as a reference in decision making, often encounters obstacles and delays, both at the internal and external levels. At the internal level, police intelligence is often late in providing information to the law enforcement function (Reserse). So that there is a delay in action or the law enforcement function has taken legal action without input from the Police intelligence. In preventing radicalism and terrorism is expected how police intelligence can run effectively by collecting and gathering information on people and groups related to radicalism and terrorism. Intelligence must also collect information about people suspected of being related to radicalism and terrorism. In addition, after collecting information and working together with various parties, what needs to be done is to convey information to the law enforcement function. Because it will be useless if intelligence has a lot of information but is not conveyed to the law enforcement function (BJA, 2008: p. 4-5).

### **Prevention Strategy by the Police Security Intelligence at the South Sumatra Regional Police level**

The best way to combat terrorism is by fighting terrorist organizations and fighting their ideology that remains within the framework of democracy and in accordance with existing rules. In addition, the government continues to prepare special forces with modern and sophisticated equipment and weapons (Sevinc and Guler, 2016: p BJA, 2008: p. 5-6). This means that the approach taken in overcoming terrorism can be a soft approach or a hard approach. The soft approach can be in the form of counseling, guidance and taking a persuasive approach to groups suspected of having the potential to lead to radicalism. While the hard approach is in the form of strict law enforcement with measured actions and still complying with applicable rules, both national laws and international



conventions. The most important issue in exploring this issue is how intelligence strategy can be used to support decision making for law enforcement in preventing, detecting and conducting investigations and investigations of terrorism cases. In the context of this paper, intelligence strategy is an intelligence product that is expected to support decision making to design and implement organizational strategies in order to reduce and prevent terrorism. At the beginning of the rampant terrorist attacks in Indonesia, namely in the early 2000s, the most important role in revealing terrorism cases was practically the Bomb Task Force formed at Polda Metro Jaya, while in other regional police there were no units that handled terrorism crimes. Only after the Bali Bombing I, the Indonesian National Police (Polri) formed the Special Anti-Terror Detachment (Densus 88)<sup>2</sup>. Initially, Densus 88 was also formed in each Regional Police, but because it did not function effectively, Densus 88 Polda was finally disbanded and Densus 88 Regional Task Force (Satgaswil) was formed which oversees several Provinces such as Satgaswil Sumbagsel oversees five Provinces. Finally, in 2019, another restructuring was carried out, namely the formation of Satgaswil in each Province, but under the direct control of the Head of Densus 88 Anti-terrorism at the National Police Headquarters. The Densus 88 Satgaswil in each province has its own intelligence unit tasked with detecting, investigating and collecting information to be analyzed and submitted to the leadership of Densus 88 as material for decision making.

At the Regional Police (Polda) level, there is also an intelligence structure, namely the Directorate of Intelligence and Security, which has quite broad main tasks, namely in the fields of ideology, politics, economy, socio-culture and security. Initially, the Directorate of Intelligence of the Regional Police also did not have a unit to detect plans for terrorist actions by radical groups. In practice, it was only in 2015 that the intelligence function was systematically involved in detecting the potential for radical groups leading to terrorism, namely with the Quick Wins (QW) program.<sup>3</sup> at that time and one of the fourth activities was the formation of the Police Operational Task Force (Satgas) Counter Radicalism and Deradicalization (specifically ISIS). This task force is under the Kasubdit IV Dit Intelkam on a daily basis which only has one unit specifically tasked with countering terrorism. So the responsibility for preventing terrorism by intelligence at the Polda level is only carried out by one intelligence unit with only four or five personnel.

The Intelligence Task Force carries out updates on data on radical groups and individuals, conducts data collection, mapping of radical groups in the jurisdiction of the South Sumatra Regional Police. This also includes the formation and development of networks and the mobilization of groups and individuals. This task force is assisted by other supporting functions such as the Binmas function which is tasked with providing counseling, conducting visits and conducting Focus Group Discussions (FGD). Then the Directorate of Special Criminal Investigation carries out cyber patrols against radical content on social media. The task force is also assisted by the Public Relations (Humas) function which carries out the formation of public opinion, neutralizing the mass media so that the news does not appear to be biased towards the development of radical groups. In this task force there is also a Brimob function which carries out data collection, mapping, investigations for counter and deradicalization targets. Finally, Densus 88 Satgaswil carries out cooperation with related agencies, carrying out deradicalization with selective priority targets for terrorist convicts (Napiter), former Napiter, and their families. So actually, if the Counter Radical and Deradicalization Operation Task Force can run simultaneously, it is already an implementation of ILP.

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<sup>2</sup>The Indonesian National Police's Special Detachment (Densus) 88 Anti-Terror was first formed based on Chief of Police Decree No. 30/VI/2003 dated 20 June 2003, and first inaugurated on the 24th at Polda Metro Jaya by the Chief of Polda Metro Jaya, Inspector General of Police Drs Firman Gani. Densus 88 was formed on the initiative of Kombes Pol Drs Gories Mere and was first led by AKBP Drs M Tito Karnavian, MA.

<sup>3</sup>The Quick Wins (QW) program is a national program that is an elaboration of President Joko Widodo's Nawacita program in 2014. The Indonesian National Police, which is one of the elements of government that develops duties as a maintainer of security, order, protecting and serving the community and enforcing the law, includes this QW program in the 2015-2019 Indonesian National Police Restra. The QW program is described by the Indonesian National Police in eight activities, one of which is the fourth activity, namely "Establishment and Effectiveness of the Indonesian National Police Counter Radical and Deradicalization Ops Task Force (specifically ISIS) whose leading sector is the Indonesian National Police Intelkam ranks starting from the Headquarters (Mabes), Regional Police and Resort Police levels. Activity IV involves supporting functions, namely the Binmas Function, Public Relations, Criminal Investigation, Densus 88 and Brimob.

Mapping against radical groups, both those who have carried out attacks and those who have not, are very much needed for analysis and prediction materials. By conducting mapping, the activities of former perpetrators and the potential for the emergence of new radical groups will be known. Mapping is done by collecting information, descriptive materials, both directly from the target, intelligence networks and various other information. In addition, the Counter-Radical and Deradicalization Ops Task Force also formed the Attached Supervisory Officer (Bawaskat) for former perpetrators, deportees and people who are included in the core group, supporters and sympathizers. Bawaskat is tasked with supervising every activity carried out by the core group and supporters with the aim of knowing the movements of people who have been involved in acts of terrorism with the aim of whether the person has the potential to repeat their actions or also recruit others to follow their ideology. The Polri Ops Task Force in the IV Quick Wins activity held internal coordination meetings periodically, namely every three months and external coordination meetings involving the Heads of the Polres Intelkam Unit and representatives of related agencies every six months. Related agencies that participated in the external coordination meeting included the Ministry of Religion, Kesbangpol, FKPT, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) and others.

But the demand for intelligence information preparation for law enforcement that ends in the criminal justice system. At the national level, in terms of law enforcement in the field of terrorism, the implementation of Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) has begun. ILP is a method that supports police management. ILP is defined as an operational tactic that can reduce crime through proactive policing that is the target of criminal intelligence (Ratcliffe, 2008; p. 6) At the regional level (Polda) this effort has been carried out but has not been maximized and consistent.

Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) focuses on law enforcement intelligence to prevent crime or criminal acts. The implementation of Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) has begun. ILP is a method that supports police management. ILP is defined as an operational tactic that can reduce crime through proactive policing that is the target of criminal intelligence (Ratcliffe, 2008; p. 6). The operational tactics that have been implemented so far are by forming, fostering networks and raising intelligence on targets that have the potential to reduce the potential for the growth of radicalism. Network development is carried out by police intelligence with the aim of finding out if there are plans for terrorist actions by radical groups. From this series of activities, intelligence makes reports, analyses, predictions and recommendations that must be carried out by the police function and related agencies to minimize the development of radicalism.

The theory of law enforcement intelligence strategy and its practice has slowly developed and intelligence has tried to prove and provide added value to law enforcement. The concept of ILP initially emerged after the terrorist attack on the WTS twin towers 9/11 in 2001, where the results of the evaluation by the National Security Commission in the United States that intelligence had been considered to have failed in providing early warning to decision makers and related stakeholders in order to anticipate the devastating terrorist attack. In the context of Indonesia, after the Bali Bombing I on October 12, 2002, the intelligence community has also been considered to have failed in anticipating and providing warnings about the impending terrorist attack in Bali. So it is necessary to study a system and concept in maximizing the intelligence community and a structured information distribution system so that related parties can take proportional preventive actions according to their respective fields, so as to minimize the loss of property and human lives.

In fact, in intelligence theory there are also elements on a more specific scale that should also run, namely what is known as the intelligence cycle or intelligence cycle or intelligence figure Polri Y Wahyu Saronto calls it the Intelligence Cycle (RPI). This intelligence cycle or RPI consists of planning and direction, information gathering, processing and use or distribution. At the processing stage there is an effort called analysis and evaluation of information materials (Saronto, 2018: p. 30-31). Simply put, in Polri intelligence education it is taught like that. There are different ways of viewing the intelligence cycle, as mentioned by Teodor Octavia Tropotei (Tropotei, 2018: 81). Theodor sees all areas in the intelligence cycle, namely planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, all accompanied by evaluation and feedback. The intelligence cycle explained by Teodor Octavia Tropotei created by the American School of Thought can be described as follows:



Image: Intelligence Cycle

In the first stage is the planning of the target plan for collecting data or information and providing direction and identification of initial data. Continued with the collection of data and information needed with intelligence techniques and tactics both openly and secretly. Then continued with the process of processing data and information obtained in the form of selecting information according to the degree of quality and validity. The next stage is the process of analyzing data and information obtained to create an intelligence product which is continued with the distribution of the intelligence product to related parts that need the intelligence product, especially for users or heads of institutions who can decide on a policy to take action in accordance with the recommendations of the intelligence product.

All of these processes are accompanied by evaluation and input/suggestions from the implementing party (agent) and also from the principle agent or even from other parties in the internal intelligence. This is the model of the information gathering process in the intelligence function to become a quality product. So in the implementation of information gathering that is focused on crime prevention, all stages and elements of the intelligence cycle must be functional and must contribute positively to each other in order to produce a quality intelligence product that can be used as material for decision making for terrorism prevention. Intelligence products in the form of intelligence reports or other reports should be able to predict (predictive) groups that have the potential to lead to radicalism and will carry out terror attacks both in South Sumatra and elsewhere.

## Conclusion

The emergence of the terrorist movement and radical groups in South Sumatra cannot be separated from global developments. The radical groups in South Sumatra were initially affiliated with Jamaah Islamiah (JI) but in accordance with the development of more progressive terror groups in the next development of terror groups in South Sumatra affiliated with JAK and JAD. The development of radical groups can be anticipated by the police as evidenced by several arrests made by Densus 88 and the South Sumatra Regional Police throughout 2017, 2018 and 2020. However, anticipation and prevention of the emergence of these terror groups have not been based on the role of Intelligence-led Policing with predictive policing which is sourced from intelligence information with accurate threat predictions produced by the security intelligence of the South Sumatra Regional Police.

Formation of the Police Ops Task Force for Counter Radicalism and Deradicalization in The Quick Wins program has gradually played a role in the Polda security intelligence in anticipating and preventing terrorism and the emergence of radical groups in South Sumatra. This task force is supported by several supporting functions within the police with a pattern of coordination both internally and externally. What needs to be considered is the quality of information and intelligence products produced by the Polda Intelkam so that they can be used by users as a basis for policy making and as material for related functions and agencies in preventing terrorism. The strategy for reducing the potential for radicalism by detecting the potential vulnerability of the development of radical ideology in the midst of society, including community groups that gather exclusively in large numbers, relatively small. If there is such a group, then their activities need to be watched out for and intelligence officers must detect early on the people who are involved in the group and must know the forms of activities they do, their duration, intensity, location, funding and so on.

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