

REACTUALIZATION OF THE NON-ALIGNED PRINCIPLE IN INDONESIA'S DIPLOMACY UNDER PRABOWO'S ERA: A CASE STUDY OF THE STATEMENT AT SPIEF 2025

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Abstract

This article analyzes the recontextualization of the Non-Aligned principle in Indonesia's foreign policy under President Prabowo Subianto, using his speech at the *St. Petersburg International Economic Forum* (SPIEF) 2025 as a case study. The focus of this research is how Indonesia's *free and active* principle is reinterpreted within the dynamics of a multipolar geopolitical order and growing rivalries among major powers. This study is significant as it demonstrates that the Non-Aligned principle is no longer a mere historical symbol but an adaptive diplomatic strategy that strengthens Indonesia's position as an independent and constructive middle power. Employing the theoretical frameworks of *Foreign Policy Analysis* (FPA), *Middle Power Diplomacy*, and *Role Theory*, the study adopts a qualitative-descriptive method with a case study approach and applies discourse and content analysis techniques. Data were obtained from the President's official speech, SPIEF documents, and credible media reports. The findings reveal that President Prabowo's speech reflects Indonesia's commitment to active neutrality maintaining political and military non-alignment while proactively promoting peaceful solutions and cross-bloc cooperation. The revitalization of the Non-Aligned principle thus represents Indonesia's adaptive diplomatic strategy to preserve sovereignty and global relevance amid contemporary geopolitical shifts.

Keywords: *Foreign Policy, Global Diplomacy, Middle Power, Non-Aligned, Prabowo*

INTRODUCTION

Since its independence, Indonesia has established that its foreign policy is grounded in the principle of being *free and active*, as articulated in Vice President Mohammad Hatta's 1948 speech, famously encapsulated in the phrase "*rowing between two reefs*." This principle signifies that Indonesia would not align itself with any military bloc while remaining actively engaged in efforts to promote peace and global order based on independence, lasting peace, and social justice (Hatta, 1953). Such a stance allowed Indonesia to avoid direct involvement in the ideological rivalry between the Western Bloc led by the United States and the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. At the same time, it positioned Indonesia as a central actor in non-aligned multilateral forums such as the 1955 Bandung Asian-African Conference and the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. The *free and active* principle was not merely normative but also strategic, enabling Indonesia to safeguard its political sovereignty while maintaining broad engagement in international diplomacy. Within this framework, Indonesia's involvement in the NAM reflected its commitment to a fairer multipolar world order and the aspirations of Third World countries to build global solidarity free from great-power domination (Leifer, 1983). Over the decades, the meaning of non-alignment has evolved in line with changes in the international system. After the Cold War and into the era of globalization, the *free and active* principle remained relevant in guiding Indonesia's diplomatic maneuvering to balance economic engagement with major powers without succumbing to political subordination (Sukma, 1995). In the contemporary geopolitical context, this principle has regained its significance. The global tensions between the Western Bloc—led by the United States and NATO and Eastern powers such as Russia and China have created new dynamics in international relations. Competition in technology, economics, and open conflicts such as the Russia–Ukraine war and the Middle East crises have intensified pressures on developing countries, including Indonesia, to take sides in the emerging global divide. Here lies the importance of non-alignment as a strategic approach to maintaining foreign policy independence while actively mediating and promoting peaceful solutions to global conflicts (Acharya, 2011).

One arena that illustrates this strategy is Indonesia's participation in the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF). SPIEF is an annual forum hosted by Russia, often seen as a counterpart to the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, which is more dominated by Western countries. The forum serves as a vital platform for Global South nations to discuss issues of development, trade, and economic cooperation on an equal footing and free from hegemonic narratives (Kortunov, 2023). Therefore, Indonesia's participation in this forum is not only diplomatic but also symbolic it underscores the consistency of Indonesia's foreign policy strategy in fostering cooperation without submitting to any particular geopolitical axis. At SPIEF 2025, President Prabowo Subianto reaffirmed this principle by stating that Indonesia "will never be part of any military bloc" and emphasizing the importance of respecting sovereignty and resolving conflicts through dialogue and diplomacy (Gerindra, 2025). This statement carries strategic significance beyond its normative tone, as it underscores the continuity of the *free and active* doctrine while positioning Indonesia as a *middle power* that bridges rival blocs.

The urgency of this analysis lies in the growing need to understand how Indonesia navigates the increasingly complex shifts in global geopolitics without losing its diplomatic identity. In a climate where external pressures to choose sides are mounting, assessing the practical realization of the non-aligned principle becomes crucial for formulating adaptive yet nationally grounded foreign policy. The rationale for this analytical endeavor is both academic and practical: to evaluate the relevance of the *free and active* doctrine in maintaining regional stability and enhancing Indonesia's image on the global stage. Against this backdrop, this study aims to analyze how President Prabowo's statement at SPIEF 2025 reflects the *reactualization* of the non-aligned principle in Indonesia's contemporary foreign policy. Using a *foreign policy analysis* (FPA) framework and *diplomatic discourse analysis*, this paper seeks to explore the strategic meaning of the speech within an increasingly multipolar and competitive international system, while identifying new directions in Indonesia's foreign policy that balance idealism with realpolitik.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Free and Active Principle and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

The *free and active* principle has been the foundation of Indonesia's foreign policy since the early years of independence. The term *free* signifies that Indonesia does not bind itself ideologically or militarily to any major power, while *active* reflects Indonesia's commitment to playing an active role in promoting international peace and justice. This principle was first articulated by Mohammad Hatta in his 1948 speech "*Rowing Between Two Reefs*," which advised Indonesia to avoid entanglement in the ideological confrontation between the Western (liberal) and Eastern (communist) blocs (Hatta, 1953). Historically, the principle gained concrete expression through the 1955 Asian-African Conference (AAC) in Bandung, which emphasized solidarity among Third World nations and rejected alignment with any major power rivalry. The conference laid the groundwork for the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 in Belgrade, where Indonesia played a founding and leading role (Leifer, 1983). NAM became an important platform for nations seeking to preserve sovereignty while promoting development and global justice. However, following the end of the Cold War, debates emerged concerning the relevance of the free and active principle and NAM in an era of globalization and economic liberalization. Anwar (1994) argues that Indonesia's foreign policy has shifted from normative idealism toward pragmatism, driven by economic development needs and global market integration. Nevertheless, the free and active principle remains a normative foundation and a symbol of Indonesia's diplomatic identity to this day. Thus, historical literature demonstrates that the free and active principle functions not only as a moral compass but also as an adaptive political instrument enabling Indonesia to navigate a changing global order without losing its ideological orientation.

Non-Aligned Diplomacy in the Multipolar Era

In today's increasingly multipolar world, Indonesia faces growing challenges in maintaining its non-aligned stance. The emergence of new geopolitical coalitions such as BRICS, QUAD, AUKUS, and IPEF signifies a reconfiguration of global power relations that demands a more flexible diplomatic approach. Nugroho (2023) observes that each alliance presents both opportunities and risks, offering economic benefits while posing potential dependencies or implicit alignments. Indonesia practices a *strategic hedging* strategy maintaining balanced relations with multiple powers without exclusive alignment. For instance, Indonesia's participation in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) coexists with its engagement in China's *Belt and Road Initiative* (BRI), including the Jakarta–Bandung high-speed rail project (Chong, 2020). This strategy demonstrates Indonesia's effort to preserve strategic autonomy amid major power rivalries.

Global crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine conflict have further tested this stance. Djajal (2022) notes that Indonesia's position calling for peace without explicitly condemning any party reflects a form of *active neutrality*, a reinterpretation of the free and active principle suited for an interdependent global context. These studies indicate that Indonesia's contemporary non-aligned diplomacy is no longer ideologically rigid but pragmatically adaptive to multipolar realities.

Previous Studies on Indonesia's Stance in International Forums

Empirical studies highlight Indonesia's consistent use of international forums to reaffirm its non-aligned position and mediatory role. Fitriani (2022) illustrates how Indonesia, during the 2022 *G20 Bali Summit*, successfully bridged the interests of the G7 and the Global South by emphasizing narratives of inclusive development and energy transition. Regionally, Indonesia has maintained active roles in ASEAN and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), particularly in advocating for Palestinian rights demonstrating its enduring commitment to principles of justice and humanitarianism. Dewi Fortuna Anwar (2023) affirms that although Indonesia's foreign policy has become more pragmatic and economically oriented, the free and active principle remains the guiding norm underpinning its multilateral diplomacy. This body of literature suggests that continuity and flexibility are the hallmarks of Indonesian diplomacy its approach evolves with global dynamics while preserving its normative orientation.

Continuity or Change in Foreign Policy after the Jokowi Administration

The leadership transition from President Joko Widodo to President Prabowo Subianto has sparked academic discussions about the continuity or transformation of Indonesia's foreign policy orientation. Some observers argue that Prabowo adopts a more realist and nationalist approach, focusing on military modernization and strengthening Indonesia's strategic leverage (The Jakarta Post, 2024). However, his statements at the *St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF)* 2025 reaffirming non-alignment and global peace demonstrate continuity in Indonesia's core foreign policy values. This suggests that while leadership style and political priorities may shift, Indonesia's fundamental diplomatic principles remain anchored in the free and active doctrine, now recontextualized within a changing global landscape. This study builds upon that insight by examining how this principle is rearticulated in President Prabowo's SPIEF 2025 address.

Theoretical Framework

Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and Levels of Analysis

Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) emphasizes that foreign policy behavior is shaped not only by international structures but also by domestic actors and decision-making processes. Kenneth Waltz (1959) introduced the *levels of analysis* framework individual, state, and international system to explain the multifaceted nature of foreign policy decisions. At the individual level, President Prabowo Subianto brings a military background and strong nationalism, yet his SPIEF 2025 speech adopted a conciliatory, non-aligned tone reflecting a symbolic narrative to balance Indonesia's global image. At the state level, Indonesia's historical identity as a NAM leader provides moral and strategic grounding. At the international level, tensions between U.S. NATO and Russia–China shape Indonesia's limited but flexible diplomatic maneuverability. The FPA approach thus offers a multi-layered lens for analyzing Indonesia's evolving foreign policy behavior.

Middle Power Diplomacy and Strategic Hedging

Indonesia is often categorized as a *middle power* a state that lacks dominant military capabilities but wields influence through diplomacy and norm entrepreneurship (Cooper, Higgott & Nossal, 1993). As a middle power, Indonesia emphasizes consensus-building, multilateralism, and conflict mediation. In practice, *strategic hedging* has become a key instrument for Indonesia to maintain autonomy amid major power competition. Goh (2005) explains that hedging involves engaging with multiple great powers to maximize benefits while avoiding overdependence on any single one. President Prabowo's remarks at SPIEF 2025 promoting cooperation with Russia without antagonizing the West exemplify this strategy in contemporary diplomacy.

Role Theory: Indonesia as Mediator and Promoter of Peace

Role theory in foreign policy studies argues that state behavior is guided by national identity and external expectations. Holsti (1970) introduced the concept of *national role conception*, referring to policymakers' internalized beliefs about their country's appropriate role in world affairs.

For Indonesia, the roles of mediator, bridge-builder, and promoter of peace have been integral to its diplomatic identity since the Sukarno era evident in the Asian-African Conference, NAM leadership, and mediation efforts in Cambodia (1980s), Myanmar (2021), and Palestine. At SPIEF 2025, President Prabowo's reaffirmation of non-alignment and global peace reflects the continuation of Indonesia's *national role conception* as a moral and peace-promoting actor amid geopolitical rivalry.

Synthesis and Research Gap

The reviewed literature demonstrates that while Indonesia's *free and active* principle and non-aligned diplomacy have been extensively discussed from historical and conceptual perspectives, few studies have examined how these principles are recontextualized in the post-2020 multipolar era. This study aims to fill that gap by analyzing President Prabowo Subianto's SPIEF 2025 address as a contemporary manifestation of Indonesia's non-aligned principle. By integrating *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *Middle Power Diplomacy*, and *Role Theory*, this research provides a multidimensional understanding of Indonesia's foreign policy through ideological, strategic, and identity-based lenses.

METHOD

This research method outlines the research design, focus and data sources, materials and tools used, data collection techniques, and analytical approaches applied to achieve the study's objectives. The study employs a qualitative-descriptive approach, aimed at understanding the meaning, narrative, and context of Indonesia's foreign policy through an interpretation of President Prabowo Subianto's speech at the 2025 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF). This approach is chosen because it allows the researcher to deeply explore the symbolic and political context of diplomatic actions without being bound by numerical generalizations. In line with Neuman (2014), qualitative research emphasizes the interpretation of social and political phenomena through subjective meaning-making rather than purely empirical measurement. Methodologically, this research adopts the case study method, as defined by Yin (2018), which is an empirical approach used to investigate contemporary phenomena within their real-life context, particularly when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. The case under examination focuses on President Prabowo Subianto's 2025 SPIEF speech, which serves as the main analytical point to understand the reactivation of the non-alignment principle in Indonesia's foreign policy. The case was selected for its significance as a strategic economic-political forum that brings together countries from the Global South and Eurasia, serving as an alternative to Western-dominated platforms such as the World Economic Forum (WEF).

The primary subject of this research is diplomatic texts and foreign policy narratives as units of analysis. The data consist of both primary and secondary sources. Primary data are derived from President Prabowo Subianto's official 2025 SPIEF speech published on the official website of the Gerindra Party (2025), representing the direct form of diplomatic communication by the head of state. Secondary data include supporting documents and reports such as press releases from Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, official SPIEF 2025 reports, and news coverage from credible media outlets such as *The Jakarta Post*, *Kompas.id*, *Reuters*, and *Al Jazeera English*. Secondary data also encompass analyses and opinions from international relations experts concerning Prabowo's speech and Indonesia's position in the global system. All sources were selected based on their validity, authority, and objectivity in reporting diplomatic events. The research materials consist of written documents speeches, transcripts, news articles, and official reports collected online from government and reputable media websites. Data collection was conducted through documentation and digital archival searches, in which all speech texts and reports were verified for authenticity and categorized according to their relevance to the study's focus, namely the narrative of non-alignment and Indonesia's *bebas aktif* (free and active) foreign policy. The process continued with data reduction to filter textual sections containing strategic, symbolic, and ideological elements.

Data analysis employs two main approaches: diplomatic discourse analysis and content analysis. Diplomatic discourse analysis is used to understand the meaning and narrative structure constructed in President Prabowo's speech by examining symbols, word choices, and rhetorical structures that represent Indonesia's position on the global stage. Van Dijk (1997) asserts that political discourse serves as a site for the production of power and the representation of ideology; therefore, this method is appropriate for analyzing how Indonesia asserts its identity as a non-aligned state and a promoter of peace. Meanwhile, content analysis is applied to identify themes, patterns, and categories emerging from the texts and supporting documents. Referring to Krippendorff (2004), content analysis aims to interpret the symbolic meaning of political communication that is not always explicitly stated. The analysis involves three main stages: data reduction selecting speech and document segments relevant to concepts such as

“neutrality,” “peace,” “non-alignment,” and “global cooperation”; data display organizing information into thematic categories; and conclusion drawing linking empirical findings to theoretical frameworks such as *foreign policy analysis*, *middle power diplomacy*, and *role theory*. Through this methodological design, the study aims to provide an in-depth understanding of how Indonesia’s foreign policy under President Prabowo Subianto, in the post-Jokowi era, recontextualizes the non-alignment principle through contemporary diplomatic practices.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Content and Context of President Prabowo’s Speech at SPIEF 2025

The speech delivered by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Prabowo Subianto, at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) 2025 stands as a significant statement in reaffirming Indonesia’s new direction in foreign policy after the Joko Widodo era. In a forum attended by more than one hundred national delegations, Prabowo emphasized that Indonesia would not join any military alliance and would remain committed to the *bebas aktif* (free and active) principle as the foundation of its foreign policy (Gerindra, 2025). This statement rearticulated “independent” as freedom from subordination to great powers, and “active” as constructive engagement in the pursuit of global peace. Conceptually, this stance aligns with Valerie Hudson’s (2005) theory of *foreign policy analysis*, which argues that a state’s foreign policy is shaped not only by the structure of international power but also by its national values, identity, and perceptions. In this context, Prabowo reaffirmed that Indonesia’s diplomatic identity remains rooted in the ideals of independence and global justice. The speech also reaffirmed Indonesia’s commitment to peaceful resolutions in the Palestinian and Ukrainian conflicts two global issues that serve as benchmarks of Indonesia’s diplomatic consistency. In the case of Palestine, Indonesia’s position is grounded in morality and international law, while in the case of Ukraine, it reflects a principle of non-intervention and *active neutrality* (Djalal, 2022). Furthermore, Prabowo emphasized Indonesia’s intention to act as a “bridge-builder” amid great power rivalries. According to Holsti’s (1970) *role theory*, this role reflects a state’s identity as a global mediator that bridges competing blocs. The speech reinforced Indonesia’s image as a *middle power* that rejects confrontation and prioritizes diplomacy, consistent with Indonesia’s multilateral diplomacy during the 2022 G20 Bali Summit, which successfully maintained balance amid Western–Russian tensions. Thus, Prabowo’s speech was not merely symbolic it represented both the historical continuity and the strategic adaptation of Indonesia’s diplomacy to the realities of global multipolarity.

The Strategic Meaning of the Non-Alignment Principle

Prabowo’s reaffirmation of the non-alignment principle carries strategic significance beyond rhetoric. In today’s increasingly multipolar geopolitical environment marked by rivalry between the United States and its allies on one side and Russia and China on the other Indonesia’s adherence to the free and active principle exemplifies a form of *strategic hedging* (Goh, 2005). This strategy allows Indonesia to maintain positive relations with all major powers while safeguarding its foreign policy autonomy. By adhering to non-alignment, Indonesia preserves its unique position among global powers. This practice aligns with the *middle power* approach that favors *flexible alignment* and avoids military entanglements that might constrain diplomatic maneuverability (Kuik, 2008). In this sense, Prabowo’s statement does not signify rejection of global cooperation but rather a reaffirmation of Indonesia’s political independence amid growing geopolitical pressures. Historically, Indonesia possesses moral credentials as a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement and host of the 1955 Bandung Conference. Through his speech at SPIEF, Prabowo seeks to revive that spirit in the 21st century, where non-alignment no longer denotes passive neutrality but *active engagement* in multilateral diplomacy (Acharya, 2011). This position places Indonesia as a *bridge-builder* between the Global North and Global South, strengthening its moral legitimacy in global issues such as Ukraine, Palestine, and Indo-Pacific stability.

Global Context and International Response

Prabowo’s speech at SPIEF cannot be separated from the global context of the post COVID-19 world and the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, both of which have accelerated the transition toward a multipolar world order (Acharya, 2023). In this environment, many influential middle powers, including Indonesia, have adopted more autonomous and adaptive diplomatic strategies. Indonesia participates in various cross-bloc initiatives, such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) initiated by the United States, while also engaging with BRICS and maintaining strategic partnerships with Russia and China. This demonstrates the practice of *equidistance diplomacy* the ability to sustain balanced relations without falling into the orbit of any single power (Hooijmaaijers & Keijzer, 2023). Russia’s positive response to Indonesia’s stance at SPIEF praising it as a rational and credible

partner further reinforces Indonesia's reputation as a respected diplomatic actor by all sides (The Moscow Times, 2025). From the perspective of *role theory*, this behavior shows that Indonesia acts as both a *balancer* and a *normative actor* in the international system committed to peace, international law, and inclusive dialogue. This approach illustrates how Indonesia's foreign policy blends moral idealism with strategic pragmatism.

The Reactualization of the Non-Alignment Principle under Prabowo

Under President Prabowo's leadership, the non-alignment principle is no longer viewed as passive neutrality but as a dynamic and contextual strategy of *active neutrality*. This concept emphasizes political independence while expanding Indonesia's constructive role in facilitating global dialogue (Anwar, 2022). Prabowo has strengthened the economic dimension of the non-alignment principle through *non-aligned economic diplomacy* economic cooperation across blocs without political subordination. This approach is reflected in Indonesia's simultaneous engagement in both IPEF and BRICS+. The strategy embodies *strategic autonomy* (Goh, 2007), allowing Indonesia to maximize economic benefits while maintaining diplomatic sovereignty. This reactivation is also evident in Indonesia's approach to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which rejects military confrontation and emphasizes inclusive cooperation. In global forums such as the G20 and the OIC, Indonesia continues to assert its role as a promoter of dialogue and an advocate for global justice. Thus, Indonesia's foreign policy under Prabowo revives the spirit of non-alignment in a modern and functional form, centered on national interest, strategic independence, and global solidarity (Acharya, 2021).

Implications for Indonesia's Foreign Policy

The reactivation of the non-alignment principle under President Prabowo carries significant implications for Indonesia's foreign policy orientation. First, Indonesia reinforces its role as a *normative power* that upholds values of peace, justice, and sovereignty in international diplomacy (Hudson, 2005). Second, this position strengthens Indonesia's leadership within the Global South as a spokesperson for a more inclusive and equitable global order particularly in issues such as climate change, technological access, and global economic reform (Anwar, 2023). However, this strategy demands sophisticated diplomatic management. Indonesia must carefully balance its relations with the world's three major powers the United States, China, and Russia while maintaining consistency with its non-aligned principles. In this regard, *strategic hedging* remains crucial: leveraging opportunities for cooperation without entering into binding political commitments (Cooper et al., 1993). Overall, Indonesia's foreign policy direction under Prabowo demonstrates both continuity of values and strategic innovation. Free and active principle remains the foundation but is now realized through *flexible multilateralism* an adaptive, inclusive, and contextually relevant diplomatic model. Through this strategy, Indonesia is poised to maintain its strategic autonomy while enhancing its credibility as a moral power and a respected global balancer.

CONCLUSION

President Prabowo Subianto's statement in his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) 2025 underscores a new direction in Indonesia's foreign policy, rooted in the *free and active* principle but with an orientation that is more adaptive to contemporary geopolitical dynamics. The speech reflects a serious effort to reactualize the meaning of non-alignment in the increasingly complex context of a multipolar world. Whereas during the Cold War era the principle of non-alignment was interpreted as rejecting involvement in military alliances, in today's era of globalization and renewed strategic competition, non-alignment is understood as *strategic autonomy*: the ability to engage and cooperate with all major powers without compromising national sovereignty. Analytical findings from the discussion indicate that Indonesia's foreign policy under President Prabowo Subianto has the potential to strengthen the country's position as an independent and constructive *middle power*. Indonesia is no longer merely an observer in global affairs but is emerging as an active player seeking to balance interests among power blocs such as the United States, China, and Russia. This approach aligns with the concept of *middle power diplomacy*, wherein Indonesia can act as a *bridge-builder* and *norm entrepreneur* building channels of communication between major powers and initiating new norms that promote justice and global peace. The reactivation of the non-aligned principle also emphasizes that Indonesia's foreign policy is not meant to be passively neutral but rather to play an active role in building peaceful coalitions and advocating diplomatic solutions to conflicts. This is reflected in Indonesia's growing participation in global forums such as the G20, ASEAN, BRICS+, and the Global South Summits. Thus, the *free and active* principle is not merely a normative slogan but an operational strategy aimed at maintaining sovereignty while expanding influence in the international arena.

However, the realization of this modern non-aligned diplomacy vision requires strong institutional foundations and sufficient resources. The main challenge Indonesia faces is to enhance its diplomatic capacity in line with its broader geopolitical ambitions. This includes strengthening diplomatic institutions, expanding networks of foreign policy think tanks, and improving diplomats' competencies in multilateral and economic diplomacy. Furthermore, inter-ministerial coordination must be reinforced so that foreign policy implementation does not operate in isolation but is integrated through a *whole-of-government diplomacy* approach. As a forward-looking development plan, the Indonesian government needs to undertake several strategic steps. First, diversify its diplomatic platforms globally, not only focusing on Western forums but also strengthening participation in Global South forums. Second, promote innovation in economic diplomacy to ensure that international cooperation remains free from political subordination. Third, strengthen diplomatic human resources, including public, digital, and cultural diplomacy, to enhance Indonesia's *soft power*. Fourth, consolidate Indonesia's position as a credible mediator in major global issues such as Palestine, Ukraine, the South China Sea, and climate governance. Through these measures, the non-aligned principle long regarded as a historical foundation of Indonesia's foreign policy will gain renewed meaning as a strategic pillar for navigating the uncertainties of the 21st century. Indonesia thus has the potential to emerge not only as a *free and active* state but also as a *middle power* capable of leading global dialogue and cooperation on the basis of peace, equality, and justice.

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