

FROM FIELD SERVICE TO VALUE-ADDED PARTNER: DESIGNING AN INTEGRATED TALENT MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR THE 2030 STRATEGY TRANSFORMATION

Dwi Hariaji Karmoyono^{1*}, Aurik Gustomo²

^{1,2}School of Business and Management, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Jakarta, Indonesia

*Corresponding author e-mail: dwi.hariaji@karmoyono.com

Received: 21/08/2026 | Revised : 06/09/2026 | Accepted: 24/09/2026 | Published: 28/09/2026

Abstract

Regional consolidation leaves multinational IT functions with thin local teams whose value must be argued rather than assumed, which makes role transformation a condition of their continued relevance. This study asks why a twelve-person IT field service team covering Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines was not moving toward the three value-added roles named in its own 2030 strategy and designs a talent management framework in response. In a single-case census, ten associates and the team lead were interviewed on the five ADKAR (Awareness, Desire, Knowledge, Ability, Reinforcement) conditions of individual change readiness, the company engagement survey was read through the McKinsey Organizational Health Index, and eleven associates self-assessed their proficiency for each target role. The entering hypothesis, that career insecurity suppressed willingness, was not supported: no account reported unwillingness. Roles were named but not scoped, recognition was not matched by reward, and development competed with an operational load that had not been reduced. The framework has three pillars (role architecture, a role-specific competency model, and performance criteria that attach a consequence to movement) resting on protected development capacity. The study contributes a convergent two-level diagnostic and a design rule: judge development on observable progress, not inferred disposition.

Keywords: change readiness; organizational health; role clarity; role transformation; talent management

INTRODUCTION

Multinational corporations increasingly coordinate dispersed operations through regional headquarters. Explicit, codifiable information is comparatively simple to coordinate remotely, although never without cost, whereas tacit knowledge tends to require on-site demonstration or face-to-face contact (Belderbos et al., 2017). Where support functions are consolidated in this way, the local presence can be kept lean, and the team studied here began from that position: predominantly reactive, hardware-centric field service, a “hands-and-legs” role that we use to mean face-to-face support that cannot be delivered remotely.

The IT function itself is being redefined. Bharadwaj et al. (2013) argue that IT strategy should no longer be subordinate to business strategy and describe a fusion of the two, which they term digital business strategy. Sebastian et al. (2017) identify two technology-enabled assets in incumbent companies: an operational backbone that supports efficiency, and a digital services platform that supports agility and rapid innovation. Regional consolidation corresponds closely to the operational backbone. We add an argument of our own: the platform draws on local business context, so a local team confined to the hands-and-legs role would leave it without a local contribution.

The transition is also a question of people. Trenerry et al. (2021) show in an integrative review that digital transformation depends on multi-level people factors such as attitudes toward technological change, skills and training, leadership, and human resources. For Southeast Asia, Ha and Chuah (2023) report that the lack of home-grown technology talent is the most pressing issue for regional companies and that hard skills alone are not sufficient. For a team expected to move into new roles, talent management thus becomes a central enabling condition.

This article examines a regional IT field service team of eleven associates and a team lead, covering Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines within the internal IT division of a multinational technology group. A field service target operating model introduced in 2023 and a regional strategy for 2030 name three destination roles: business analyst (IT business partner), solution delivery and testing professional, and local cybersecurity consultant. The team leader observed that associates were not seeking growth beyond their current role boundaries. What was observed is an absence of movement; attributing it to a lack of ambition is management’s reading, not an established cause.

The annual engagement survey showed asymmetry. Favourable responses reached 89% to 98% on four learning items, such as being encouraged to come up with better ways of doing things (98%), yet only 55% agreed that “I feel there is a safe future for me at this company” and 61% saw effective collaboration between organizational units (Table 1). High learning scores make a shortage of curiosity unlikely, and the low safe-future score pointed toward career insecurity, which meta-analytic evidence links to lower proactive skill development, fewer career opportunities, and lower employability (Låstad *et al.*, 2025). We carried this reading into the field as a proposition, because a survey can show an association, but not which condition is binding, and this one has no item on role knowledge, capacity, or recognition.

The study asks four questions. How should an integrated talent management (ITM) framework be designed to support the move from field service toward value-added IT partnership roles (RQ1)? Which organizational and individual factors inhibit the move (RQ2)? What is the role readiness gap for each target role, and which is widest (RQ3)? What components should the framework contain (RQ4)? The contribution is incremental and tied to one case: a diagnostic that requires an organizational lens and an individual lens to converge before design, the reuse of an existing survey as a structured proxy with its measurement cost declared, and a design step that traces each component to a finding.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Strategic fit and integrated talent management

Strategic human resource management (SHRM) concerns the alignment of HR practices with strategy (vertical fit) and with one another (horizontal fit). Han *et al.* (2019), using nationally representative panel data, find that the benefit of vertical fit is magnified when the practices of a high-performance work system are implemented with greater internal consistency across the ability, motivation, and opportunity domains. Talent management has been defined as the systematic identification of key positions, the development of a talent pool to fill them, and a differentiated HR architecture to manage that pool (Collings & Mellahi, 2009). We use “integrated” in a working sense of our own: career pathways, competency development, and performance criteria are designed to reinforce one another and point toward the same target roles, a claim about horizontal fit layered on vertical alignment. The resulting three pillars (role architecture, a competency model, and performance criteria) are our design, not a canonical model.

Diagnostic lenses: organizational health and change readiness

The diagnosis is read through two lenses. The Organizational Health Index (OHI), developed by McKinsey & Company, addresses non-financial conditions that predict sustained performance (De Smet *et al.*, 2014) through nine outcomes: Direction, Leadership, Work Environment, Accountability, Coordination and Control, Capabilities, Motivation, Innovation and Learning, and External Orientation (McKinsey & Company, n.d.). It is used here as an organizing lens for the engagement survey, which is not the OHI instrument; assigning its items to OHI outcomes is an analytical interpretation and not a validated OHI score. The ADKAR model (Hiatt, 2006) sets out five sequential building blocks of individual change: Awareness, Desire, Knowledge, Ability, and Reinforcement. It originates in consulting practice and not in psychometric development, so it structures enquiry and orders findings without scoring individuals, and its sequential claim is treated as a proposition. Weiner (2009) anchors it in peer-reviewed work by conceptualizing organizational readiness as a shared psychological state in which members are committed to a change and confident in their collective ability to implement it. Because ADKAR is individual-level and the framework is a team-level artifact, the bridge is made by counting stages across individual accounts. This will be described further in Method.

Role clarity, capacity, and the attribution of non-movement

A third body of work explains why a person who is both willing and able may still not move. Lan *et al.* (2025), in a three-wave survey of 352 frontline employees and supervisors in 13 high-star hotels in China, found that role clarity and job competence enhance taking-charge behaviour by increasing organization-based self-esteem, so that proactive engagement depends on competence and a clear understanding of the role as well as on willingness. Where a strategy names a destination without scoping it, absence of initiative is therefore difficult to tell apart from low ambition, although the two call for opposite interventions (our inference). A second condition works through resources. Huang and Li (2025), studying 873 Chinese public sector employees, found that digitization-oriented job demands increased thriving at work, which facilitated job crafting, and also increased workplace anxiety, which led to work withdrawal; the same demand produced opposite behaviours. Reviewing 65 papers, Hewett *et al.* (2018)

describe the actor–observer effect, whereby actors attribute their own actions to external causes and observers attribute the same actions to internal features, with subordinates predominantly external and supervisors internal in occupational safety research. A diagnosis drawn from managerial observation alone will therefore tend to locate the cause in the person, and one drawn from associate accounts alone in the organization, so this study reads both and treats their divergence as evidence.

These strands treat willingness, role clarity, resource capacity, and managerial attribution separately; this study examines them together in one bounded team whose strategy names roles that have not been scoped. Read together, they give a design logic (a talent intervention must be vertically aligned to the 2030 strategy and horizontally consistent within itself) and one diagnostic proposition carried into the field: that career insecurity, appearing organizationally as a weak Direction profile and individually as a blocked Desire, is the binding constraint on role transformation, so pathway visibility should be addressed first.

METHOD

The study is a single case examined from a pragmatist position, which suits research driven by a practical problem (Kaushik & Walsh, 2019). It is qualitative-dominant, with survey and self-assessment data in a descriptive, corroborating role, and design-oriented. The team was approached as a census of eleven associates and a team lead. A scored ADKAR instrument was rejected: ten accounts cannot support inferential testing, and only the interviews separated Awareness met at strategy level from Awareness unmet at role level.

Four sources were used. The company's anonymous annual engagement survey supplied eight items for the team, at a single time point and without a baseline. Internal documents (the operating-model definition and the 2030 regional strategy) were read as purpose-produced records of intended direction and role definitions, not of current practice. Semi-structured interviews were held with ten of the eleven associates (the eleventh is the first author) and, separately, with the team lead on a manager protocol that follows the same ADKAR sequence, so that both accounts address the same five conditions from opposite sides of the reporting line. Interviews were held remotely in English, the corporate working language, and audio-recorded with consent. Because English is a second language for most participants, each recording was worked into a structured summary organized by the protocol's ADKAR blocks, keeping participants' own words where they carried the meaning, and re-checked against the recording. The summaries support thematic comparison but not discourse-level analysis. Finally, all eleven associates, including the first author, completed a written self-assessment before the interview, rating current and self-set 2030 target proficiency for each target role on a five-point scale (Table 3) and describing the support they would need. Questionnaire responses (numbered) and interview accounts (lettered) are not linked, so that a rating and a quotation could not together identify a respondent; only a team-level readiness profile can therefore be built.

The survey was analysed descriptively through a four-step mapping onto the nine OHI outcomes: each item is listed with its exact wording, assigned to the single outcome whose published definition it most directly indicates, excluded and listed where it indicates none, and characterized only where mapped items support it, with single-item outcomes reported as indicative only. Results are read as relatively strong or weak within the team, never as scores. Interview summaries were analysed by framework analysis (Gale *et al.*, 2013), drawing on the thematic logic of Braun and Clarke (2006). The deductive template was the five ADKAR stages and the nine OHI outcomes, with inductive codes added in the same pass, and coded material was charted in a matrix of participants by categories. The team lead was charted as a separate, uncounted row, because it records observation of others and not self-report, and was read for convergence and divergence. A stage is treated as blocked where the gap appears in at least seven of the ten associate accounts and is attributed to a common condition. The self-assessment was analysed descriptively by role.

The framework was derived through a synthesis step. Its three pillars come from the ITM construct, as RQ4 names them, and were not generated by the data; the diagnosis supplies whether each pillar acts on a condition present in this team, the content it must carry, the order of building, and any condition the architecture lacks. A finding became a component where it was blocked or constraining at or above the seven-of-ten threshold, or where associate and team lead accounts corroborated one another; a finding outside the scope of a team-level framework was recorded as a boundary condition; and a finding meeting neither was recorded as not carried forward, with its density. The rule was set at the design stage, before the results were read. The artifact was checked for completeness and for internal consistency, both of which test derivation and not effect.

The first author is a member of the team under study, holds a leadership role in it, and reports to the team leader who was also interviewed. This gave access to the whole team and its documents, and it also shapes what participants were willing to say. Three effects were anticipated: interviews were not anonymous to the interviewer

whereas the survey is anonymous, so divergence between them is expected and is not read as one correcting the other; participants may have been reluctant to disclose reluctance to a colleague in a leadership role; and the first author's prior reading of the problem could steer the questions asked and the material retained. Four measures were taken: the protocol was written before analysis and applied consistently; questions asked what participants had experienced and not whether they agreed with a proposition; summaries were re-checked against recordings; and the central proposition was treated as testable throughout. No institutional ethics-committee review was obtained. Participation was voluntary, consent to recording was sought and recorded, and participants could decline any question or stop at any time. Reported material is de-identified, no individual or location is named in connection with any quotation, the organization is anonymized, and internal documents are used under its confidentiality provisions.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The study entered the field with career insecurity as its candidate root cause; however, the primary data did not support it. What the accounts report instead is roles named without being scoped. Survey percentages below are indicative context and not team-level measurements, so the diagnosis rests on the interview evidence.

Organizational health: the survey read through the OHI

Table 1 reproduces the assignment of the eight available survey items. Innovation and Learning is the only outcome supported by two items both above 90%, and Direction the only one supported by two items both below 70%. The other four covered outcomes rest on a single item each and are indicative only, and Accountability, Motivation, and External Orientation are not covered. That silence belongs to the instrument, but it means a condition operating through Motivation would be invisible in the survey. Item H3 also contradicts the primary data: it scores 91% on Capabilities while every interview account reports a skill gap against the target roles. Both can hold, since one rates a learning behaviour the team has and the other a proficiency it lacks, so we read the divergence as an artefact of item wording and as the measurement cost of repurposing an engagement survey.

Table 1. Survey items mapped to OHI outcomes

ID	Survey item	Favourable	OHI outcome assigned
H1	I am encouraged to come up with better ways of doing things	98%	Innovation and Learning
H2	In my work environment, we take advantage of new technologies and digitalization	93%	Innovation and Learning
H3	In my work environment, we continuously learn the crucial skills to achieve our goals	91%	Capabilities
H4	In my work environment, leaders support my engagement in learning	89%	Leadership
L1	I feel there is a safe future for me at this company	55%	Direction
L2	In my work environment, people generally act for the good of the company as a whole rather than focusing on their own interests	59%	Work Environment
L3	In my work environment, there is effective collaboration between organizational units	61%	Coordination and Control
L4	I can identify with the company's mission statement	66%	Direction

Individual change readiness: the ADKAR reading

Table 2 sets the associate accounts against the team lead account. Willingness is intact. Desire is expressed without hesitation in seven accounts ("I don't feel hesitant, because I like to learn new things"), qualified by role fit and not by reluctance in the other three, and denied in none. Acceptance of the change as permanent and a learning orientation appear in all ten accounts, and supportive line management in nine. The obstruction lies on either side of Desire. Awareness is met at strategy level in nine accounts and unmet at role level in all ten: an associate can restate where the team is going without being able to state what they are personally expected to become ("It's like we have to build a road by myself"). Role and scope ambiguity, an inductive code, also appears in all ten. Knowledge fails as one associate put it: "In general context I know what needs to be done, but in detail I have no idea." Ability is

constrained in all ten, most often by capacity (“We don’t have extra energy to grow ourselves”), and Reinforcement fails because, in one associate’s words, “It gets noticed. It doesn’t get rewarded.”

Table 2. ADKAR stages across the associate and team lead accounts

ADKAR stage	Associate interviews (n = 10)	Team lead interview	Diagnosis
Awareness	Met at strategy level in 9 of 10; unmet at role level in 10 of 10: no account can state what the role contains, its standard, or who will hold it	Communicates the direction and the reason for it; gives no account of role content or entry route	Blocked at role level
Desire	Met in 7 of 10 with hesitation explicitly denied; the other 3 qualify by role fit, not willingness. No account reports unwillingness	Reads the team as two groups, growth mindset and fixed mindset; attributes hesitation to low interest	Not blocked
Knowledge	A gap in at least 8 of 10, the rest role-selective: what is missing is a statement of which competences the role requires, and at what level	Places capability building with individuals plus learning platforms; names central facilitation of budget and expertise as required	Blocked
Ability	A constraint named in 10 of 10: capacity in 4; practice environment, information access, budget, practice route, scope, and training adequacy in 1 each	Names the same capacity constraint: the team is held by current tools and process, and time and task management is failing	Blocked
Reinforcement	A gap in 9 of 10 (1 partial): stepping up is noticed and sometimes announced, but carries no reward	Names a recognition channel and informal occasions as the reward; deliberately leaves non-learners unprotected	Blocked

Convergence, divergence, and the root cause

Applying the seven-of-ten rule, four stages are blocked and Desire is not. Three divergences are used and not smoothed: Capabilities (above), Motivation, and the gap between associates and team lead. On Motivation, the survey extract has no item, yet nine of ten accounts report that movement is noticed and not rewarded, so a diagnosis resting on the survey alone would have left the Reinforcement constraint invisible and the third pillar without an evidential basis. The team lead reads the team as two groups, growth mindset and fixed mindset, and attributes hesitation to low interest (“fixed mindset, low interest maybe”), whereas the associates without exception describe situational constraints: unclear role scope, an unstated competence standard, no allocation of people to roles, and hours consumed by operational delivery. This is the actor–observer pattern that Hewett et al. (2018) record. Neither account is dishonest; managerial observation alone would have located the cause in the person and prescribed motivation, while associate accounts alone would have located it wholly in the organization. One condition is named identically on both sides of the reporting line: associates describe development competing for hours with an operational load that has not been reduced, and the team lead describes a team held by current tools and process, with time and task management failing. Agreement where the actor–observer pattern predicts disagreement gives capacity the strongest evidential position in the dataset.

The lenses therefore converge on one account. The target roles have been named without being scoped, and the direction terminates above the role. Knowledge fails downstream, because a competence cannot be acquired against a standard that has not been issued; Reinforcement fails at the other end, because progress toward an undefined destination cannot be rewarded on evidence; and Ability is constrained throughout by an operational load that has not been reduced. In answer to RQ2, associates are inhibited by three organizational conditions (a direction never resolved into role definitions, a capability gap against roles with no stated competence standard, and movement recognized but not rewarded) and one resourcing condition, an operational load that leaves no hours for development. The binding constraint is the absence of a scoped role, not the absence of will.

Role readiness gap across the three target roles

Table 3 reports the self-assessment. The mean gaps (1.27, 1.09, 1.00) lie within a quarter of a scale point, so the profile is read on current standing and target ambition. Local cybersecurity consulting has the lowest current mean (2.45), with four of eleven associates at or below 2, the largest mean gap, and also the lowest target (3.73), with four associates setting their ambition at 3 or below. The team is least prepared for this role and least oriented toward it: no associate mentioned cybersecurity when asked what support they would need, and three named artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, or automation, none of which is among the three target roles. Solution delivery and testing have the highest current mean (3.64, no associate below 3) and the highest target (4.64, eight associates at 5): a role the team is reaching for and has not yet reached, needing depth and practice exposure and not a rationale. Business analysis shows the widest dispersion, with current ratings from 1 to 5 (median 3) and targets split between five associates at 5 and three at 3 or below, which suggests no shared view of what the role is. Three limits apply: scale points are not behaviourally anchored, each role was rated as a whole, and targets are self-set, so a small gap may signal low ambition as readily as high readiness.

Table 3. Self-assessed current and 2030 target proficiency (n = 11)

Target role	Mean current	Mean target	Mean gap
Business analyst (IT business partner)	3.09	4.18	1.09
Solution delivery and testing	3.64	4.64	1.00
Local cybersecurity consultant	2.45	3.73	1.27

Scale: 1 = no exposure, 2 = minimum knowledge, 3 = can perform with support, 4 = deliver but can be better, 5 = fully proficient.

The integrated talent management framework

Two features of the diagnosis fix the shape of the response. First, willingness is already present, so a framework aimed at generating commitment would act on the one stage found unobstructed; this removes conditions and treats the intact base as a delivery mechanism, since line-manager mentoring and associate self-direction can carry the pillars because both are shown to exist. Second, the diagnosis fixes the content and order of the three pillars and identifies one condition the architecture lacks (see Method). Image 1 shows the architecture and Table 4 its sixteen components.




Image 1. The integrated talent management (ITM) framework

Vertical alignment ends every pillar in the 2030 role definitions, and horizontal consistency binds the three through one competence vocabulary, so that the standard fixed in Pillar One, the model built in Pillar Two, and the criteria applied in Pillar Three name the same competences at the same levels. The order of building runs between layers and not between pillars. Definition comes first as a single exercise, in which the role charter (1.1), competence

standard (1.2), and competency model (2.1) are produced together, since a level cannot be fixed for a competence not yet named and a competence cannot be named for a role whose accountabilities are undrawn. Allocation (1.3, 1.4) and delivery (2.2 to 2.4) follow, the criteria depend on all of it, and capacity precedes everything, because none of it operates without hours.

Table 4. Components of the ITM framework and the findings each acts on

Pillar or layer	Components	Finding acted on (density)
Pillar One: role architecture and career-pathway visibility	1.1 Role charters (scope, boundary, decision rights, accountability); 1.2 competence standard per role at a stated level; 1.3 entry route and allocation (who decides, on what evidence, by when); 1.4 line of sight from the 2030 strategy to the individual role	Roles named but not scoped (role and scope ambiguity, 10 of 10); Awareness blocked at role level (10 of 10); Direction unclear in 7 of 10
Pillar Two: competency model and differentiated curriculum	2.1 Competency model per role, on the self-assessment scale; 2.2 sequencing differentiated by role; 2.3 practice environment; 2.4 learning-access governance (central budget and expertise)	Knowledge blocked (at least 8 of 10); skill gap against the target roles (10 of 10); readiness profile of three roles
Pillar Three: strategy-aligned performance and reward criteria	3.1 Transition progress as a rated objective; 3.2 reward carrying a consequence, distinct from recognition; 3.3 criteria set against the Pillar One standard and Pillar Two model; 3.4 alignment to 2030 milestones; 3.5 criteria applied on observable evidence, not judgement of disposition	Reinforcement blocked (9 of 10); Motivation constraining (9 of 10); attribution divergence between team lead and associates
Enabling condition: development capacity	E.1 Protected development hours with a named owner; E.2 reduction or reallocation of the operational load; E.3 statement as a management commitment with a decision owner	Ability constrained (10 of 10); capacity named by 4 associates and corroborated by the team lead

Three design rules deserve comment. Pillar One supplies architecture and not messaging, since the direction is already heard. Pillar Two differentiates by role, since one curriculum would fail on two roles for opposite reasons: local cybersecurity consulting needs a rationale and exposure before any curriculum, business analysis a shared definition first, and solution delivery and testing depth and practice. A stated refresh cycle is attached as a principle derived below the threshold, since a fixed syllabus decays where the subject changes faster than it can be learned. Pillar Three must preserve a distinction the accounts draw: recognition already exists, so supplying more of it would address the wrong half of the finding. Its criteria therefore attach a consequence to progress and are applied on observable role-progress evidence and not on managerial judgement of disposition, a rule derived from the attribution divergence, since a reward that runs on judgement of disposition would penalize associates for a condition the organization created.

Development capacity sits beneath the pillars and not beside them, because RQ4 fixes the framework at three pillars, because it is the one finding on which both sides of the reporting line agree, because it conditions all three (a charter no one has hours to study, a curriculum no one has hours to take, and criteria rewarding progress no one has hours to make share one cause), and because releasing it is a resourcing decision held by management and not a design question the study can settle. It is derived from the Ability count of ten of ten, with the inductive capacity code (four of ten, below the threshold) naming the mechanism. Four sources of hours exist without additional headcount: reducing low-value services through automation and AI, as the divisional 2030 strategy commits; reallocating standardizable work to the central tier of the operating model; external service resource in a comparable time zone; and better scheduling and task management within the team. Three of the four depend on reductions that automation and AI have not yet delivered, which is the first implementation risk.

Implementation follows the layers. Phase 0 releases capacity (E.1 to E.3) under a named decision owner; Phase 1 builds role architecture and the competency model together (1.1 to 1.4 and 2.1); Phase 2 the curriculum, practice environment, and access governance (2.2 to 2.4); and Phase 3 the criteria (3.1 to 3.5). The team leader owns the sequence; whereby regional and divisional leadership hold the resourcing and reward decisions. Monitoring re-runs the self-assessment and ADKAR reading annually against the baseline means of 3.09, 3.64, and 2.45, tracking take-up of cybersecurity offers separately. Because ADKAR is used as a diagnostic and not as a change plan, the capacity commitment is communicated first, role-level content follows, and Desire receives no communication act,

since a message aimed at generating commitment would act on the one condition found unobstructed. Role charters and objectives are co-set with associates, since participation in goal setting raised proactive behaviour through perceived insider status, more strongly where power distance was high, among 336 employees in 20 Chinese service companies (Pervaiz et al., 2021); transfer to a team spanning three countries is untested.

Discussion

The diagnostic proposition was not supported. Desire is intact in every account, which removes suppressed motivation as the mechanism, and the pathway-visibility response survives for a different reason than the one first offered: what associates lack is not reassurance about their future but a scoped destination. A proposition treated as a premise would have produced a framework built on reassurance and aimed at a stage never obstructed. The finding fits Lan et al. (2025), for whom proactive engagement depends on role clarity and competence and not on willingness alone, and it explains why the behaviour resembles low ambition, which is the team lead's reading. The capacity finding is consistent with the demand structure Huang and Li (2025) describe: the same associates sustain the existing service and build its replacement, so low participation in development is a predictable feature of that structure and not a failure of time management.

The study also returns a qualified result on ADKAR. Desire is intact although Awareness is blocked at role level and three later stages are blocked, a pattern a strict sequence does not accommodate. The stages behave more like conditions that must each be satisfied than an ordering in which an early gap forecloses all that follows; this reading comes from one case and is offered as a proposition. For SHRM, vertical alignment is conditional on the organization scoping the roles, which the strategy has not yet done, and horizontal fit rests on the single competence vocabulary, the property most at risk because each pillar is likely to be built by different hands.

Two propositions extend beyond the case and are offered for testing elsewhere. Where a strategy names a destination without scoping it, non-movement resembles low ambition, and motivational communication may address the one condition that is not obstructed. And an Ability constraint corroborated across the reporting line is one no framework can resolve, because it is a resourcing decision; organizations adopting talent frameworks should identify their own equivalent before implementation.

Four limitations apply. The population is eleven associates and one team lead, so every figure is descriptive and the findings describe one bounded case, the only multi-country team in its regional group (AOK: ASEAN, Oceania, Korea), not relevant to other teams. The interviews were coded by the first author alone, a team member, with no inter-coder agreement reported, and the intact-Desire finding rests on self-report in interviews that were not anonymous. The self-assessment records perceived readiness, not a measured competence. Lastly, the framework was checked for derivation and not for effect.

CONCLUSION

The study set out to explain why associates of a regional IT field service team were not self-initiating the transitions their own strategy required, and to design a framework that releases them. The framework stands as three pillars (role architecture, a role-specific competency model, and strategy-aligned performance criteria) on one enabling condition, protected development capacity. The conclusion with most consequence for management is the negative one: the observation that opened the study was accurate as behaviour and mistaken in attribution, because the entering hypothesis of career insecurity was not supported and the binding constraint was the absence of a scoped role.

Four actions follow. The team leader should issue role charters for the three target roles before commissioning any training, stating scope, boundary, decision rights, accountability, the competence standard at a stated level, and the entry route; set standards and objectives with associates; and assess progress on observable evidence. Regional and divisional leadership should release development capacity as a stated commitment with a named decision owner, attach a consequence to development progress in advancement, role allocation, or remuneration, and fix a proficiency standard for the roles at regional level. The local cybersecurity role warrants separate treatment, with a rationale and exposure before any curriculum. Further research should test the framework in use, isolate the capacity condition, compare a single-country team, pair the self-assessment with an assessed rating, and test whether the attribution divergence narrows once a role is scoped. The team does not need a programme to make its associates want to change. It needs the organization to finish defining what it has asked them to become, and to release the hours in which they could become it.

REFERENCES

- Belderbos, R., Du, H. S., & Goerzen, A. (2017). Global cities, connectivity, and the location choice of MNC regional headquarters. *Journal of Management Studies*, 54(8), 1271–1302. <https://doi.org/10.1111/joms.12290>
- Bharadwaj, A., El Sawy, O. A., Pavlou, P. A., & Venkatraman, N. (2013). Digital business strategy: Toward a next generation of insights. *MIS Quarterly*, 37(2), 471–482. <https://doi.org/10.25300/MISQ/2013/37.2.3>
- Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 3(2), 77–101. <https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa>
- Collings, D. G., & Mellahi, K. (2009). Strategic talent management: A review and research agenda. *Human Resource Management Review*, 19(4), 304–313. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hrmr.2009.04.001>
- De Smet, A., Schaninger, B., & Smith, M. (2014, April 1). The hidden value of organizational health—and how to capture it. *McKinsey Quarterly*. <https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/people-and-organizational-performance/our-insights/the-hidden-value-of-organizational-health-and-how-to-capture-it>
- Gale, N. K., Heath, G., Cameron, E., Rashid, S., & Redwood, S. (2013). Using the framework method for the analysis of qualitative data in multi-disciplinary health research. *BMC Medical Research Methodology*, 13, Article 117. <https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-13-117>
- Ha, H., & Chuah, C. K. P. (2023). Digital economy in Southeast Asia: Challenges, opportunities and future development. *Southeast Asia: A Multidisciplinary Journal*, 23(1), 19–35. <https://www.emerald.com/seamj/article-pdf/23/1/19/2254000/seamj-02-2023-0023.pdf>
- Han, J. H., Kang, S., Oh, I.-S., Kehoe, R. R., & Lepak, D. P. (2019). The Goldilocks effect of strategic human resource management? Optimizing the benefits of a high-performance work system through the dual alignment of vertical and horizontal fit. *Academy of Management Journal*, 62(5), 1388–1412. <https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2016.1187>
- Hewett, R., Shantz, A., Mundy, J., & Alfes, K. (2018). Attribution theories in human resource management research: A review and research agenda. *The International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 29(1), 87–126. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09585192.2017.1380062>
- Hiatt, J. M. (2006). ADKAR: A model for change in business, government and our community. Prosci.
- Huang, H., & Li, J. (2025). Master or escape: Digitization-oriented job demands and crafting and withdrawal of Chinese public sector employees. *Behavioral Sciences*, 15(3), Article 378. <https://doi.org/10.3390/bs15030378>
- Kaushik, V., & Walsh, C. A. (2019). Pragmatism as a research paradigm and its implications for social work research. *Social Sciences*, 8(9), Article 255. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8090255>
- Lan, M., Hu, Z., & Nie, T. (2025). Unwilling or unable? The impact of role clarity and job competence on frontline employees' taking charge behaviors in hospitality industry. *Behavioral Sciences*, 15(4), Article 526. <https://doi.org/10.3390/bs15040526>
- Låstad, L., Pienaar, J., Näswall, K., Richter, A., Hellgren, J., & Sverke, M. (2025). Moving on up now? A meta-analysis of the associations between job insecurity and career-related outcomes. *Scandinavian Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, 10(1), Article 2. <https://doi.org/10.16993/sjwop.275>
- McKinsey & Company. (n.d.). How OHI works. Retrieved April 11, 2026, from <https://www.mckinsey.com/solutions/orgsolutions/overview/organizational-health-index/how-ohi-works>
- Pervaiz, S., Li, G., & He, Q. (2021). The mechanism of goal-setting participation's impact on employees' proactive behavior, moderated mediation role of power distance. *PLOS ONE*, 16(12), Article e0260625. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0260625>
- Sebastian, I. M., Ross, J. W., Beath, C., Mockler, M., Moloney, K. G., & Fonstad, N. O. (2017). How big old companies navigate digital transformation. *MIS Quarterly Executive*, 16(3), Article 6. <https://aisel.aisnet.org/misqe/vol16/iss3/6>
- Trenerry, B., Chng, S., Wang, Y., Suhaila, Z. S., Lim, S. S., Lu, H. Y., & Oh, P. H. (2021). Preparing workplaces for digital transformation: An integrative review and framework of multi-level factors. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 12, Article 620766. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.620766>
- Weiner, B. J. (2009). A theory of organizational readiness for change. *Implementation Science*, 4, Article 67. <https://doi.org/10.1186/1748-5908-4-67>