Reconstruction of The Election System: An Efforts to Minimize Transactional Politics in Indonesia

Abstract

Transactional politics has become a fundamental challenge in the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia. The phenomenon of "money politics" and the high cost of political contests often stems from an electoral system design that is less capable of curbing short-term exchanges of interest between candidates, political parties, and voters. This article aims to analyze the urgency of reconstructing the electoral system in Indonesia as a strategic step to minimize transactional practices that undermine the integrity of the democratic process. The research method used is juridical-normative with a descriptive-analytical approach, examining election regulations and literature related to voter and political party behavior. The study finds that the open-list proportional system currently implemented, despite increasing candidate proximity to constituents, actually triggers internal political cannibalism and high-cost competition that widens the gap for transactional politics. As a solution, this article proposes reconstruction through three main pillars: first, redesigning the electoral system to emphasize strengthening party institutions rather than just figure-based politics; second, reforming political party financing systems to be transparent and accountable in order to reduce dependence on illicit donors; and third, strengthening law enforcement through the synchronization of electoral supervisory authorities. This reconstruction is expected to shift political orientation from a transactional model toward an idea-based politics grounded in programs and integrity. The conclusion of this article asserts that without structural changes to the electoral system, efforts to eradicate transactional politics will remain superficial without addressing the root of the problem.