Judicial Budgeting Regulations In Indonesia, The United States of America and The Netherlands For Independent Judiciary

Abstract

Judicial independence is a prerequisite for the rule of law, yet its realization depends not only on institutional guarantees but also on adequate and autonomous financial resources. This study examines and compares the legal frameworks governing judicial budgeting in Indonesia, the United States, and the Netherlands, with attention to the allocation of authority, budget formulation, and opportunities for external interference. Employing a normative juridical method and a comparative legal approach, the research analyzes constitutional provisions, statutory regulations, and institutional arrangements shaping budgetary decision-making across the three jurisdictions. The analysis reveals a shared challenge: although judicial institutions formulate their financial requirements, their budget proposals remain subject to executive review or approval, creating potential vulnerabilities to political influence and compromising financial autonomy. Nevertheless, the extent and mechanisms of executive involvement differ according to each country's constitutional structure and governance traditions. These findings underscore the importance of establishing stronger safeguards to ensure transparent, predictable, and sufficient judicial funding without undermining public accountability. For Indonesia, the study recommends constitutional regulation of a minimum percentage of the state budget allocated to judicial institutions, accompanied by implementation and oversight mechanisms. Such reform could strengthen judicial independence, institutional stability, and public confidence in the administration of justice.